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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a logical analysis of the concept of responsibility
attribution; that is, how agents ascribe responsibility about the consequences of actions,
either to themselves or to other agents. The paper is divided in two parts. The first part
investigates the importance of the concept of responsibility attribution for emotion theory
in general and, in particular, for the theory of attribution emotions such as guilt, pride,
moral approval and moral disapproval. The second part explores the collective dimension
of responsibility attribution and attribution emotions, namely the concepts of collective
responsibility and collective guilt. The proposed analysis is based on an extension of the
logic STIT (the logic of “Seeing To It That”) with three different types of knowledge and
common knowledge modal operators depending on the time of choice: before one’s choice,
after one’s choice but before knowing the choices of other agents, and after the choices of
all agents have become public. Decidability of the satisfiability problem of the logic is
studied in the paper.
1 Introduction
The main object of this paper is to provide a framework for the discussion on the complexi-
ties and ambiguities that surround the concept of responsibility attribution. A wide range of
different, though connected, ideas is covered by this concept.
How and when individuals ascribe responsibility to themselves and to others is a central
question in social psychology [47]. Likewise, the concept of responsibility attribution is a
core concept in the study of emotion. Particularly, there exists a specific class of emotions,
called “attribution emotions” [37, p. 134], which arise when an individual ascribes respon-
sibility to herself or to someone else for a morally deplorable action (i.e., blameworthiness)
or for a morally admirable action (i.e., praiseworthiness). Examples of this type of emotions
are guilt and reproach. Responsibility attribution is also a relevant concept in the domain of
autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (MAS), in particular in the areas of artificial orga-
nizations, normative MAS and intelligent virtual agents (e.g., embodied conversational agents,
tutoring agents, etc.), where they prove to be useful. For instance, in the case of autonomous
agents interacting in the context of an artificial organization, agents should be endowed with
the capability to reason about their own responsibility and that of others. This kind of ca-
pability allows agents to identify those actions that might be blameworthy, because they do
not conform to the organization’s norms, and therefore refrain from performing them. More-
over, an intelligent virtual agent interacting with a human can be designed to recognize this
human’s emotions such as guilt or pride and to act consequently. This specific capacity can be
achieved by endowing the agent with the more general capability to reason about the human’s
responsibility and the human’s beliefs about her own and others’ responsibility.
Our analysis of responsibility attribution is based on an extension of the logic STIT (the
logic of “Seeing To It That”) with three different types of knowledge modal operators. Each
type of knowledge is defined with respect to the time of the agent’s choice: before one’s choice
(ex ante knowledge), after one’s choice but before knowing the choices of others (interim
knowledge), and after the choices of all agents have been made public (ex post knowledge).
The syntax and the semantics of this logic are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we show
that three different kinds of knowledge operators are necessary for a fine-grained analysis of
the different aspects of the concept of responsibility (e.g., the distinction between active and
passive responsibility, and the distinction between causal and agentive or moral responsibility).
On the basis of the concept of responsibility defined in Section 3, in Section 4 we provide a
systematic analysis of attribution emotions; that is, emotions such as guilt and reproach that are
based on the attribution of responsibility to oneself or to others. The second part of the paper
explores the collective dimension of responsibility attribution and attribution emotions, namely
the concepts of collective responsibility and collective guilt. To this aim, in Section 5 we
present an extension of the logic of Section 2 with three different types of common knowledge
modal operators (corresponding to the three previous individual knowledge modal operators).
Decidability of the satisfiability problem for our logic is studied in Section 6. Finally, related
literature and future work are discussed in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
2 Epistemic STIT logic with ex ante, interim and ex post
knowledge
STIT logic (the logic of Seeing to it That) [6] is one of the most prominent formal accounts of
agency. It is the logic of sentences of the form “agent i sees to it that ϕ is true”. In [27] Horty
extends Belnap et al.’s STIT logic with operators of group agency in order to express sentences
of the form “group J sees to it that ϕ is true”. Following [35], throughout the article we use
the terms ‘individual STIT logic’ and ‘group STIT logic’ to designate respectively Belnap et
al.’s STIT logic (in which only the actions of agents are described) and Horty’s variant of STIT
logic (in which both actions of agents and joint actions of groups are represented)1.
In this section we present an extension of atemporal group STIT that allows us to represent
the different types of agents’ knowledge defined with respect to the time of choice (i.e. the
agent’s knowledge before one’s choice, after one’s choice, or after the choices of all other
agents). We call this logic E-GSTIT (Epistemic Group STIT).
STIT has a non-standard branching-time semantics based on the concepts of moment and
history. As shown by [5, 35, 25], however, both individual STIT logic without time axioma-
tized in [6, Chap. 17], and ‘atemporal group STIT’ (i.e., group STIT without time) can be ‘sim-
ulated’ in standard Kripke semantics. A similar idea is proposed by [30], who introduce the
concept of ‘consequential models’. These consequential models are equivalent to the Kripke
atemporal group STIT models used by [25, 35], in which the authors abstract away from the
1Other authors [8, 45] use the term ‘multi-agent STIT’ instead of ‘group STIT’.
branching-time account of STIT. Here, we present an alternative semantics for STIT based on
the notion of STIT model with choice names (SCN) in which choices of agents are labelled
with action identifiers. This can be seen as an explicit action-based version of the semantics for
group STIT.2 We show that this semantics is mathematically equivalent to the STIT semantics
in terms of Kripke atemporal group STIT models introduced by [25] and, consequently, to the
STIT semantics in terms of consequential models introduced by [30].
The main reason why we provide an alternative semantics based on STIT models with
choice names is that this semantics is particularly suited to characterize the concepts of interim
knowledge and ex post knowledge. Indeed, the semantic definition of an agent i’s interim
knowledge requires that, in all epistemic alternatives of agent i, i makes the same choice.
This simply means that i’s choice has the same name in all epistemic alternatives of agent
i. Moreover, the semantic definition of an agent i’s ex post knowledge requires that, in all
epistemic alternatives of agent i, all agents make the same collective choice. This means that
the collective choice of all agents has the same name in all epistemic alternatives of agent i.
In this paper we focus on Chellas’s STIT operators, named after its proponent [11], and
we take them as primitive. As pointed out by [28], the so-called deliberative STIT operators
and the Chellas’s STIT operators are inter-definable and they differ solely in their choice of
primitive operators.
Before concluding, let us emphasize why we have decided to use STIT as a tool for our
formal analysis of responsibility instead of some alternative logic of action (e.g., dynamic
logic). The main reason is that STIT theory is compatible with both the idea of agent causation
[12] (i.e., the idea that an agent may be the cause of an event or state of affairs) and the
indeterministic view of reality. These are essential elements for the analysis of responsibility
attribution. On the one hand, we can ascribe to a certain agent i active responsibility for the
realization of a state of affairs ϕ, only if agent i brings about ϕ thereby being the cause of the
realization of ϕ. On the other hand, we can ascribe to i passive responsibility for the realization
of ϕ, only if i could have done otherwise and prevented ϕ from being true.
2.1 Syntax
Assume a countable set of atomic propositions denoting facts Atm = {p, q, . . .} and a finite
set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , n}. 2Agt∗ = 2Agt \ {∅} denotes the set of all non-empty sets of
agents alias coalitions or groups.
The language LE-GSTIT(Atm,Agt) of the logic E-GSTIT is the set of formulae defined by
the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [J stit]ϕ | K•◦◦i ϕ | K
◦•◦
i ϕ | K
◦◦•
i ϕ
where p ranges over Atm , J ranges over 2Agt and i ranges over Agt . The other Boolean
constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ in the standard way. As usual in
modal logic, 〈J stit〉ϕ is an abbreviation of ¬[J stit]¬ϕ.
We call GSTIT (Group STIT) the fragment of E-GSTIT without epistemic operators of
type K•◦◦i ϕ, K
◦•◦
i and K
◦◦•
i , whose meaning is explained below. Specifically, the language
2According to van Benthem [43] the issue of defining an explicit action/strategy-based version of STIT is one of
the fundamental problems in the area of logics of agency and game logics.
LGSTIT(Atm,Agt) of the logic GSTIT is the set of formulae defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [J stit]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm and J ranges over 2Agt .
Operators of type [J stit] are used to describe the effects of the action that has been chosen
by J . In Belnap et al.’s STIT, an agent i’s action is described in terms of the result that agent
i brings about by her acting. For example, i’s action of killing another agent j is described
by the fact that i sees to it that j is dead. Likewise, in Horty’s STIT with agents and groups,
one can make a distinction between individual actions of agents and joint actions of groups
of agents. The joint action of a group is described in terms of the result that the agents in the
group bring about by acting together.
If H ∈ 2Agt∗, the construction [H stit]ϕ has to be read “group H sees to it that ϕ, no
matter what the agents outside H do”. Analogously, if H is a singleton {i}, the construction
[{i} stit]ϕ has to be read “agent i sees to it that ϕ no matter what the other agents do”. For
notational convenience, we sometimes write [i stit] instead of [{i} stit].
[∅ stit]ϕ has to be read “ϕ is true regardless of what every agent does”, or “ϕ is true no
matter what the agents do”, or simply ‘ϕ is necessarily true’. The dual expression 〈∅ stit〉ϕ
means “ϕ is possibly true”. Note that the operators 〈∅ stit〉 and [J stit] can be combined in
order to express what agents and groups can do: 〈∅ stit〉[J stit]ϕ means “J can see to it that
ϕ, no matter what the agents outside J do”. Conceptually speaking the difference between
“see to it that” and “can see to it that” is that the former corresponds to the concept of action
(i.e., what an agent or group does) while the latter corresponds to the concept of capability
(i.e., what an agent or group can do).
Our logic E-GSTIT extends Horty’s STIT logic with three different concepts and corre-
sponding modal operators of knowledge. The operators K•◦◦i , K
◦•◦
i and K
◦◦•
i ϕ capture re-
spectively the concepts of ex ante knowledge (alias knowledge before one’s choice), interim
knowledge (alias knowledge after one’s choice and before being informed about the choices
of others) and ex post knowledge (alias knowledge after public information about the choices
of all agents is available). These three concepts of knowledge are taken from the vast literature
on game theory (notably the reference article by Aumann and Dreze [3]), where the distinc-
tion between these three stages in differential information environments is widely accepted for
games in normal form. This explicit borrowing is amply justified, because we may consider
STIT models without time as nothing but game forms in the game theoretical sense. According
to Aumann & Dreze, ex ante knowledge characterizes an agent’s knowledge assuming that she
has not made any decision yet, whereas ex post knowledge characterizes an agent’s knowledge
in a situation where every agent has made her choice and all choices are publicly disclosed.
Finally, interim knowledge characterizes an agent’s knowledge assuming that she has made her
decision about which action to take, but might still be uncertain about the decisions of others.
The formulae K•◦◦i ϕ, K
◦•◦
i ϕ and K
◦◦•
i ϕ have the following short readings: K
•◦◦
i ϕ has to be
read “the agent i has an ex ante knowledge that ϕ is true”; K◦•◦i ϕ has to be read “the agent
i has an interim knowledge that ϕ is true”; K◦◦•i ϕ has to be read “the agent i has an ex post
knowledge that ϕ is true”. The corresponding dual operators are defined as K̂xi ϕ
def
= ¬Kxi ¬ϕ
with x ∈ {• ◦ ◦, ◦ • ◦, ◦ ◦ •}.
2.2 Semantics
This section about semantics is organized in three subsections. In Section 2.2.1 we define the
class of STIT models with choice names (SCNs) and prove that these structures are mathe-
matically equivalent to Kripke atemporal group STIT models introduced by [25]. In Section
2.2.2 we add an extra epistemic component to SCNs by defining the class of epistemic STIT
models with choice names (ESCNs). Finally, in Section 2.2.3 we provide an interpretation of
E-GSTIT formulae over ESCNs.
2.2.1 STIT models with choice names
Assume a countable, possibly infinite, set of action terms Act = {a, b, . . .}. If Act is infinite,
then card(Act) =∞, where card(S) denotes the cardinality of an arbitrary set S. Similarly to
game theory, we generalize actions to strategies by defining, for every coalitionH ∈ 2Agt∗, the
set ActH of all total functions with domain H and codomain Act . Elements of ActH are the
joint actions of coalition H and are denoted by symbols αH , α
′
H , . . . Since αH is a function
αH : H −→ Act , this can be represented as a set of mappings {i 7→ αH(i)|i ∈ H}. For
example, α{1,2,3} = {1 7→ a, 2 7→ b, 3 7→ c} is the joint action of coalition {1, 2, 3} in which
agent 1 chooses action a, agent 2 chooses action b and agent 3 chooses action c.
The basic notion here is the notion of STIT model with choice names that is nothing but
a collection of binary relations on a set of worlds and a set of functions specifying the action
chosen by an agent at a certain world. Given an arbitrary binary relationR on a set of elements
W , let R(w) = {v ∈W |wRv}.
Definition 1 (STIT model with choice names (SCN)) A STIT model with choice names
(SCN) is a tuple M = 〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds;
• for every i ∈ Agt , Ai :W −→ Act is a total function mapping worlds into actions;
• R∅ is an equivalence relation between worlds in W satisfying the following condition:
(C1) for all w, u1, . . . , un ∈ W and for all a1, . . . , an ∈ Act , if u1, . . . , un ∈ R∅(w)
and A1(u1) = a1, . . . ,An(un) = an then there exists u ∈ W such that u ∈
R∅(w) and AAgt(u) = {1 7→ a1, . . . , n 7→ an};
• every RH with H ∈ 2
Agt∗ is a binary relation between worlds in W such that:
(C2) RH = {(w, v)|wR∅v and AH(w) = AH(v)};
• V : Atm −→ 2W is a valuation function for atomic formulae;
where for every H ∈ 2Agt∗, AH is a total function AH : W −→ ActH such that AH(w) =
αH if and only if Ai(w) = αH(i) for all i ∈ H .
Let us discuss the preceding notion of SCN in detail. Each function Ai specifies the action
chosen by agent i at given world. Specifically, Ai(w) is the action chosen by the agent i at
world w.
R∅(w) is the set of outcomes of the agents’ choices that are possible at world w: if v ∈
R∅(w), then, at world w, the agents can choose a joint action whose outcome is v.
For every world w and for every coalition H ∈ 2Agt∗, the set RH(w) identifies coalition
H’s actual choice at w, that is to say, the set of worlds that can be reached by coalition H’s
actual choice at w. Note that, if card(H) = 1, RH(w) is an individual choice, whereas if
card(H) > 1, RH(w) is a collective choice. Hence, if v ∈ RH(w) then v is a world that is
admitted by coalition H’s actual choice at world w.
Note that, if v is admitted by coalitionH’s actual choice at world w (i.e., v ∈ RH(w)), this
means that, given what the agents in H have chosen at w, there exists a choice of the agents in
Agt \H such that, if the agents in Agt \H made such choice, v would be a possible outcome
of the collective choice of all agents. Consequently, v ∈ RAgt\H(w) means that, given what
the agents inH have chosen at w, there exists a choice of the agents in Agt \H such that, if the
agents in Agt \ H made such choice, v would be the actual outcome of the collective choice
of all agents.
Condition C1 corresponds to a basic game theory assumption according to which, if agents
can choose their individual actions separately, they can choose them jointly as well.
Condition C2 specifies the relationship between the set of possible outcomes and the set of
worlds that can be reached by the actual choice of a coalition. According to this constraint, the
set of worlds that can be reached by the actual choice of a coalition at w is the set of possible
outcomes of the joint action that the coalition chooses at w.
We can show that SCNs are mathematically equivalent to Kripke atemporal group STIT
models, as defined in [25, 35], that in turn are equivalent to consequentialist models in the
sense of [30].3 The interesting aspect of proving the equivalence between SCNs and Kripke
atemporal group STIT models is that this result clarifies the relationship between the standard
semantics of STIT and the representation of social interaction in game theory. Indeed, STIT
models with choice names (SCNs) are very similar to games in normal form.
The following definition introduces Kripke atemporal group STIT models, or Kripke group
STIT models for short.
Definition 2 (Kripke group STIT model [25, 35]) A Kripke group STIT model is a tuple
M = 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 where:
• R∅ and every RH with H ∈ 2
Agt∗ are equivalence relations between worlds in W
satisfying the following conditions:
(C1∗) RH ⊆ R∅,
(C2∗) RH =
⋂
i∈H R{i},
(C3∗) for all w, u1, . . . , un ∈W , if u1, . . . , un ∈ R∅(w) then
⋂
1≤i≤nR{i}(ui) 6= ∅;
• V : Atm −→ 2W is a valuation function for atomic formulae.
Condition C1∗ states that the set of worlds that can be reached by the actual choice of a coali-
tion is a subset of the set of possible outcomes. In other words, a coalition can only choose
among possible outcomes. According to Condition C2∗, the set of worlds that can be reached
by the choice of a coalition is equal to the pointwise intersection of the sets of worlds that can
3As shown by [25], the semantics of group STIT in terms of Kripke atemporal group STIT models is equivalent
to the semantics in terms of S5n product models [15]. It is also worth noting that this result has been independently
proved by Gerbrandy [16] who has shown that the most general instance of the logic of propositional control can also
be interpreted over S5n product models. The logic of propositional control studied by Gerbrandy and atemporal group
STIT are indeed the same logic.
be reached by the individual choices of the agents in the coalition. That is, the collective choice
of a coalition is made up of the individual choices of the individual agents in the coalition and
nothing else. Condition C3∗ expresses the so-called assumption of independence of agents.
Intuitively, it means that agents can never be deprived of choices due to the choices made by
other agents.
The previous definition of Kripke group STIT model does not impose any restriction on the
number of available choices for an agent in a given state. Indeed, the STIT semantics allows an
agent to have an infinite number of choices. The following definition introduces the concept of
Kripke group STIT model with bounded choices, i.e., the class of Kripke group STIT models
in which the number of available choices for an agent is bounded by some n ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
Definition 3 (Kripke group STIT model with bounded choices) LetM = 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,
V〉 be a Kripke group STIT model and let P be the partition of W induced by the equivalence
relation R∅. Moreover, let n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. M is said to be a Kripke group STIT model whose
number of choices is bounded by n if and only if, for all i ∈ Agt and for allX ∈ P the number
of parts in the partition of X induced by the relation R{i} is equal to or less than n.
Note that the preceding definition also covers the case of an unbounded model M in which
an agent has an infinite number of available choices, i.e., there exists i ∈ Agt and X ∈ P such
that the number of parts in the partition of X induced by the relation R{i} is infinite (∞).
The following representation theorem establishes the formal connection between STIT
models with choice names and Kripke group STIT models.
Theorem 1 Let card(Act) = n with n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Then:
• if 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt , {Ai}i∈Agt ,V〉 is a SCN then 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 is a Kripke group
STIT model whose number of choices is bounded by n;
• if 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 is a Kripke group STIT model whose number of choices is bounded
by n then there exists a set of functions {Ai}i∈Agt such that 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt , {Ai}i∈Agt ,
V〉 is a SCN.
PROOF. Let us prove the first item by supposing that card(Act) = n and by tak-
ing a SCN M = 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt , {Ai}i∈Agt ,V〉. We are going to show that M
′ =
〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 is a Kripke group STIT model. Clearly, every relation RJ is an equiv-
alence relation and M ′ satisfies C1∗. As to C2∗, by Condition C2, we have RJ =
{(w, v)|wR∅v and AJ(w) = AJ(v)} = {(w, v)|wR∅v and Ai(w) = Ai(v) for all i ∈ J} =⋂
i∈J{(w, v)|wR∅v and Ai(w) = Ai(v)} =
⋂
i∈J R{i}. Let us prove that model M
′ sat-
isfies Condition C3∗, let us suppose that u1 ∈ R∅(w), . . . , un ∈ R∅(w). Then, because
every function Ai is total, we have that there are a1, . . . , an ∈ Act such that A1(u1) =
a1, . . . ,An(un) = an. Hence, by Condition C1, there are a1, . . . , an ∈ Act and u ∈ W such
that A1(u1) = a1, . . . ,An(un) = an, u ∈ R∅(w) and AAgt(u) = {1 7→ a1, . . . , n 7→ an}.
By definition ofR{i}, it follows that there is u ∈W such that u1R{1}u, . . . , unR{n}u. Hence,⋂
1≤i≤nR{i}(ui) 6= ∅. By the fact that card(Act) = n, it is easy to verify that for every
X ∈ P the number of parts in the partition of X induced by the relation R{i} is equal to
or less than n. Thus, M ′ is a Kripke group STIT model in which the number of choices is
bounded by n.
Let us prove the second item by supposing that card(Act) = n. Let us take an arbitrary
Kripke group STIT model M = 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 whose number of choices is bounded
by n. Let P be the partition of the set of worlds W induced by the equivalence relation R∅.
For each agent i ∈ Agt , we define Ai to be a total function Ai : W −→ Act satisfying the
following condition:
(*) for all X ∈ P and for all w, v ∈ X , Ai(w) = Ai(v) if and only if wR{i}v.
Such a function Ai is guaranteed to exist by the fact that card(Act) = n and the fact
that for every X ∈ P the number of parts in the partition of X induced by the relation
R{i} is equal to or less than n. Moreover, it is a routine task to verify that the model
M ′ = 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt , {Ai}i∈Agt ,V〉 so generated is a SCN. Indeed, M
′ clearly satisfies
Condition C2. We are going to prove that it satisfies Condition C1. Let us suppose that
u1, . . . , un ∈ R∅(w) and A1(u1) = a1, . . . ,An(un) = an. By Condition C3
∗ it follows that⋂
1≤i≤nR{i}(ui) 6= ∅. Hence, by the preceding Condition (*),⋂
1≤i≤n{u ∈W |wR∅u and Ai(u) = Ai(ui) = ai} 6= ∅.
The latter implies that there exists u ∈ W such that u ∈ R∅(w) and AAgt(u) = {1 7→
a1, . . . , n 7→ an}. 
From Theorem 1 it follows that if card(Act) = ∞ then, for every Kripke group
STIT model 〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉, there exists a set of functions {Ai}i∈Agt such that
〈W, {RJ}J⊆Agt , {Ai}i∈Agt ,V〉 is a SCN.
2.2.2 Epistemic STIT models with choice names
The following definition introduces the concept of epistemic STIT model with choice names
(ESCN), namely a SCN supplemented with an epistemic component.
Definition 4 (Epistemic STIT model with choice names (ESCN)) An epistemic STIT model
with choice names (ESCN) is a tuple
M = 〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt , {E
•◦◦
i , E
◦•◦
i , E
◦◦•
i }i∈Agt ,V〉
where:
• M = 〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt ,V〉 is a SCN;
• all E•◦◦i are equivalence relations between worlds in W ;
• all E◦•◦i and E
◦◦•
i are binary relations between worlds in W such that:
(C3) E◦•◦i = {(w, v)|wE
•◦◦
i v and Ai(w) = Ai(v)},
(C4) E◦◦•i = {(w, v)|wE
•◦◦
i v and AAgt(w) = AAgt(v)}.
We suppose that each agent has three different accessibility relations E•◦◦i , E
◦•◦
i and E
◦◦•
i
corresponding to ex ante, interim and ex post knowledge. In particular, E•◦◦i (w) is the set of
worlds that agent i considers possible before making her choice and before being informed
about the choices of other agents. We call it i’s ex ante information set at w. E◦•◦i (w) is the
set of worlds that agent i considers possible after making her choice but before being informed
about the choices of other agents. We call it i’s interim information set at w. Finally, E◦◦•i (w)
is the set of worlds that agent i considers possible after having made her choice and after being
informed about the choices of others. We call it i’s ex post information set at w.
Conditions C3 and C4 characterize the relationships between the three types of information
sets. According to Condition C3, agent i’s interim information set consists in restricting agent
i’s ex ante information set to the worlds which are consistent with i’s current choice. According
to Condition C4, agent i’s ex post information set is the result of restricting agent i’s ex ante
information set to the worlds which are consistent with the current choices of all agents. Note
that Conditions C3 and C4 ensure that E◦•◦i and E
◦◦•
i are also equivalence relations.
Remark. In some cases, it would be reasonable to suppose that RAgt\{i} ⊆ E
•◦◦
i for all
i ∈ Agt . This condition means that, before making her choice, an agent considers possible
all her available choices. However, we do not impose this constraint because we want to
allow situations in which an agent excludes some of her available decision options a priori.
For example, a person may decide to kill herself by jumping from a balcony (i.e., the action
of jumping from the balcony is an available decision option), even though she considers this
choice epistemically impossible.
2.2.3 Truth conditions of E-GSTIT formulae
A formula ϕ of the logic E-GSTIT is evaluated with respect to a given ESCN M =
〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt , {E
•◦◦
i , E
◦•◦
i , E
◦◦•
i }i∈Agt ,V〉 and a world w in M . We write
M,w |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at world w in M . The truth conditions of E-GSTIT for-
mulae are then defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Truth conditions of E-GSTIT formulae)
Let M be an ESCN and w a world in M :
M,w |= p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V(p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M,w 6|= ¬ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M,w |= ϕ AND M,w |= ψ
M,w |= [J stit]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ RJ(w) :M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= K•◦◦i ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ E
•◦◦
i (w) :M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= K◦•◦i ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ E
◦•◦
i (w) :M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= K◦◦•i ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ E
◦◦•
i (w) :M, v |= ϕ
For any formula ϕ of the language LGSTIT(Atm,Agt), we write |=GSTIT ϕ if ϕ is GSTIT valid,
that is, if ϕ is true in all SCNs (i.e., for all ECNs M and for all worlds w in M , we have
M,w |= ϕ). We say that ϕ is GSTIT satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not GSTIT valid. Moreover, for any
formula ϕ of the language LE-GSTIT(Atm,Agt), we write |=E-GSTIT ϕ if ϕ is E-GSTIT valid,
that is, if ϕ is true in all ESCNs (i.e., for all ESCNs M and for all worlds w in M , we have
M,w |= ϕ). We say that ϕ is E-GSTIT satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not E-GSTIT valid.
The following example is given in order to illustrate the notion of epistemic STIT model
with choice names (ESCN) given in Definition 4 and the truth conditions of E-GSTIT formu-
lae.
Example 1 Let us suppose that Agt = {1, 2}. Both agents 1 and 2 are writing an article
together and each of them can contribute to the joint activity by devoting either a small (action
S), a medium (action M ) or a large (action L) quantity of work to the paper. The result of the
joint action resulting from both the action of agent 1 and that of agent 2 can be either that the
paper is accepted for publication (p) or that it is not (¬p). The agents have some uncertainty
about the effects of their joint actions. For instance, agent 1 does not know whether, if they
both devote a medium quantity of work to the paper, it will be accepted.
This situation is represented by the ESCN in Figure 1 in which agent 1’s three types of
information sets are drawn in the three different subfigures 1a, 1b and 1c: agent 1’s ex ante
information set (Figure 1a), agent 1’s interim information set (Figure 1b) and agent 1’s ex post
information set (Figure 1c). Let us assume that the actual world is the world w in the left grid.
In the actual world w agents 1 and 2 can ensure that the paper will be accepted if and only
if each of them devotes at least a medium quantity of work. Indeed, for all v ∈ R∅(w) we have
M, v |= p if and only if
A{1,2}(v) ∈ {{1 7→ L, 2 7→ L}, {1 7→ L, 2 7→M}, {1 7→M, 2 7→ L}, {1 7→M, 2 7→M}}.
Furthermore, in the actual world w, before making her choice, agent 1 has some uncer-
tainty about the effect of the joint action {1 7→ M, 2 7→ M}. Indeed, at world w in Figure
1a agent 1 envisages two possible scenarios: a scenario in which they can ensure that the
paper will be accepted by both devoting a medium quantity of work (the left grid), and a sce-
nario in which they cannot ensure so (the right grid). Formally, in Figure 1a we have: (i)
there are v1 ∈ E
•◦◦
1 (w) and u1 ∈ R∅(v1) such that A{1,2}(u1) = {1 7→ M, 2 7→ M} and
M,u1 |= [{1, 2} stit]p; and (ii) there is v2 ∈ E
•◦◦
1 (w) such that for all u2 ∈ R∅(v2) if
A{1,2}(u2) = {1 7→M, 2 7→M} then M,u2 |= ¬[{1, 2} stit]p.
Note that, before making her choice, 1 does not exclude any of her available choices, in
the sense that the three actions L, M and S are all within agent 1’s ex ante information set.
This means that, for every action in {L,M, S}, before making her choice 1 envisages a world
in which she chooses such action (see Figure 1a). Moreover, after having made her choice and
before learning the choice of agent 2, 1 has a maximal uncertainty about it, i.e., 1 does not
know whether 2 is going to choose action S, action M or action L (see Figure 1b).
Note also that a difference between 1’s ex ante knowledge and 1’s interim knowledge at w
is the following: before choosing what to do herself, 1 is uncertain whether they are going to
see to it that the paper is rejected (Figure 1a); whereas, after choosing what to do (action S),
1 knows that they are going to see to it that the paper is rejected (Figure 1b). That is, in terms
of E-GSTIT formulae we have:
M,w |= K̂•◦◦1 [{1, 2} stit]¬p ∧ K̂
•◦◦
1 ¬[{1, 2} stit]¬p ∧K
◦•◦
1 [{1, 2} stit]¬p
Before concluding this section let us consider some valid principles of the logic E-GSTIT.
For all x ∈ {• ◦ ◦, ◦ • ◦, ◦ ◦ •} we have:
|=E-GSTIT (K
x
i ϕ ∧K
x
i ψ)→ K
x
i (ϕ ∧ ψ) (1)
|=E-GSTIT K
x
i ϕ→ ϕ (2)
|=E-GSTIT K
x
i ϕ→ K
x
iK
x
i ϕ (3)
|=E-GSTIT ¬K
x
i ϕ→ K
x
i ¬K
x
i ϕ (4)
If |=E-GSTIT ϕ then |=E-GSTIT K
x
i ϕ (5)
The previous validities (1)-(4) together with the rule of inference (5) highlight that ex ante, ex
interim, and ex post knowledge operators are all S5 normal modal operators.
|=E-GSTIT K
•◦◦
i ϕ→ K
◦•◦
i ϕ (6)
|=E-GSTIT K
◦•◦
i ϕ→ K
◦◦•
i ϕ (7)
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(a) Ex ante information set
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(b) Interim information set
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(c) Ex post information set
Figure 1: Example of two agents writing a paper both together
Validities (6) and (7) characterize the two basic relationships between ex ante, interim and
ex post knowledge: first, an agent knows more after the choices of all agents have became
public, than after having made her choice but before being informed about the choices of
other agents; and second, an agent knows more after having made her choice but before being
informed about the choices of other agents, than before having made her choice and before
being informed about others’ choices.
3 Responsibility
The logic E-GSTIT presented in section 2 constitutes the departure point for a theoretical
model of (agentive) responsibility that will pave the way to construct a formal model of at-
tribution emotions in Section 4. The term ‘responsibility’ has more than one meaning and is
commonly used in many senses. Therefore, let us devote this section to clarify some conceptual
differences among the different usages of the term, mainly: causal and agentive responsibility.4
Perhaps the root notion of responsibility relates to the use of the term to indicate mere
causal relation (e.g. “The fire was responsible for the damages in the building”). When we use
the term ‘responsible’ this way, we solely point out the causal relationship5 between both ele-
ments; and thus, we may attribute responsibility without imputing intentionality to the causal
origin of a given outcome. This is also the case of unintentional actions of an agent that lead
to a given outcome (e.g. when an agent accidentally drops something, causing damages to
another object); then the agent is considered causally responsible.
However, an agent’s being causally responsible for an outcome is necessary but not suf-
ficient for agentive responsibility. The reference to the conditions for holding an individual
agentive responsible has been a constant in the philosophical construction of the concept of
responsibility. In his Nicomachean Ethics [2, 1113b], Aristotle constructs the first explicit
concept of agentive responsibility. According to this Aristotelian account, a given agent i is
said to be agentive responsible for an event or state of affairs ϕ (e.g., agent j is dead) if and
only if agent i’s action that causes the state is voluntary. Moreover, Aristotle identifies two
distinctive features of a voluntary action:
• Control condition: the action must be the consequence of the agent’s actual choice in
the sense that, by making a given choice, the agent causes ϕ to be true (e.g., by choosing
to shoot with the gun, agent i causes agent j’s death);
• Epistemic condition: the agent must be fully aware of what it is she is doing or bringing
about (in the previous example, agent i knows that, by choosing to shoot the gun, she
causes agent j’s death).
Regarding both the causal and agentive responsibility, one of the possible misconceptions
of the concept of responsibility is derived from the fact of narrowing it down to its active
version; that is, to solely focus on the consequences that the agent’s actions have for other
agents. However, in order to have a broader account of the concept, we must also include
the consequences of the actions that the agent could have chosen to perform and did not (see
4This distinction is widely accepted, although the terminology used varies. Cf., e.g., [46].
5The concept of causation has deeper implications in many areas, notably for example, regarding legal conse-
quences (cf. for instance, Hart and Honore´ [24].). An analysis of this sense of responsibility would require a further
inquiry into the notion of causation, which is out of the scope of this article. Cf. Hart, [23, Chapter 9], for a further
reading on causal responsibility and its (legal) implications.
[19, p. 228] for instance). Hence, our analysis of responsibility also includes the active (the
agent’s ability to see to it that ϕ) and passive (the agent’s ability to prevent ϕ from happening)
dimensions of responsibility.
The four types of responsibility derived from the combination of the causal-agentive and
active-passive dimensions are represented in the following Table 1.
Table 1: The different types of responsibility
Responsibility
Active Responsibility Passive Responsibility
Knowledge
Active
Agentive
Responsibility
Passive
Agentive
Responsibility
No knowledge Active Causal
Responsibility
Passive Causal
Responsibility
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
In our framework, an agent is said to be causally responsible for an event, if she is the
actual cause of the event in the sense that, either she sees to it that ϕ is true (active causal
responsibility) or she could have prevented ϕ from being true (passive causal responsibility).
Following the Aristotelian view on responsibility,6 we claim that a mere causal connection
between the agent and a given outcome is not enough for attributing her agentive responsibility
for such outcome. In order to be agentive responsible for an event ϕ, the agent must know
either that her current choice makes ϕ true (active agentive responsibility) or that she could
have prevented ϕ from being true (passive agentive responsibility).
All four concepts of Table 1 are expressible in the logic E-GSTIT. Let us first consider
active causal responsibility. This concept is expressed by the so-called ‘deliberative’ STIT
operator [i dstit] [28] which is definable in the following way:
[i dstit]ϕ
def
= [i stit]ϕ ∧ 〈∅ stit〉¬ϕ
The construction [i dstit]ϕ can be read “agent i is causally responsible for bringing about ϕ”.
The negative condition 〈∅ stit〉¬ϕ is given to prevent an agent from being causally responsible
for ϕ, when ϕ is something inevitable (in the sense that it is true regardless of what every agent
does). Consequently, active agentive responsibility is defined by the abbreviation:
Resp+(i,ϕ)
def
= K◦•◦i [i dstit]ϕ
Agent i is actively agentive responsible for bringing about ϕ (denoted by Resp+(i,ϕ)) if and
only if i knows that her current choice makes ϕ true. In other words, i knowingly sees to it
that ϕ.7 For example, agent 1 can be said to be actively agentive responsible for killing agent
2 (i.e., Resp+(1,dead2 )) if and only if agent 1 knows that her current choice will lead to agent
2’s death and that agent 2’s death is not something inevitable (i.e., K◦•◦1 [i dstit]ϕ). We use
6Modern theories of responsibility are based on Aristotle’s theory. See, e.g., Pettit’s model of responsibility at-
tribution [38], based on three conditions: first, value relevance, the agent faces a morally significant choice; second,
value judgment, the agent is in a position to see what is at stake; and third, value sensitivity, the choice was within the
domain of the agent’s will or control.
7A similar concept of knowingly doing is studied by [9].
the interim knowledge operator K◦•◦i ( instead of K
•◦◦
i or K
◦◦•
i ) in the preceding definition
because, in order to be morally responsible for something, an agent has to be aware of the
potential effects of her choice after having chosen it but before knowing the choices of other
agents.
As for passive causal responsibility, we say that an agent i is passively causal responsible
for letting ϕ be true if and only if “agent i could have prevented ϕ from being true”, denoted
by CHP(i,ϕ). In E-GSTIT logic the construction CHP(i,ϕ) can be decomposed by assuming
that agent i could have prevented ϕ from being true if and only if: (1) ϕ is true in the actual
world (i.e., ϕ) and (2) given what the others have chosen to do, if i had chosen differently
then ϕ would have necessarily been false (i.e., 〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]¬ϕ).8 This notion of
passive causal responsibility has already appeared in some of our previous works [35].
CHP(i,ϕ)
def
= ϕ ∧ 〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]¬ϕ
The following is the semantic counterpart of the construction CHP(i,ϕ). We have thatM,w |=
CHP(i,ϕ) if and only if, M,w |= ϕ and there is v ∈ RAgt\{i}(w) such that M, v |=
[Agt stit]¬ϕ. That is, at world w of model M , agent i could have prevented ϕ from be-
ing true if and only if, ϕ is true at w and, given what the other agents in Agt \ {i} have chosen
at w, there exists an action of agent i such that, if agent i did choose this action, the actual
outcome of the joint action of all agents would necessarily be a state in which ϕ is false.
In order to illustrate the previous definition of CHP(i,ϕ) let us go back to the example of
Section 2.2.
Example 2 At world w in the model M of Figure 1 we have that agent 1 could have prevented
the paper from being rejected. That is:
M,w |= CHP(1,¬p)
Indeed, we have that at world w: (1) p is false and (2) given what agent 2 has chosen to do at
w (action L), there exists an action of agent 1 (action L or action M ) such that, if agent 1 did
choose this action, the actual outcome of the joint action of agents 1 and 2 would necessarily
be a state in which p is true. That is:
M,w |= ¬p ∧ 〈{2} stit〉[{1, 2} stit]p
As for passive agentive responsibility, we say that an agent i is passively agentive respon-
sible for letting ϕ be true, denoted by Resp−(i,ϕ), if and only if: (1) i knows that her current
choice leads to ϕ (i.e., K◦•◦i ϕ) and (2) given what the others have chosen to do, if i had chosen
differently then, after having made her choice, she would have necessarily known that ¬ϕ (i.e.,
〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]K◦•◦i ¬ϕ). That is:
Resp−(i,ϕ)
def
= K◦•◦i ϕ ∧ 〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]K
◦•◦
i ¬ϕ
Example 3 In the example of Figure 1, at world w agent 1 is not passive agentive responsible
for letting the paper be rejected. Indeed, at world w the second condition of the preceding
definition of passive agentive responsibility does not hold. In particular, we have
M,w |= ¬〈{2} stit〉[{1, 2} stit]K◦•◦1 p
8The formula 〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]¬ϕ expresses a ceteris paribus condition of the form “the choices of the
agents in Agt \ {i} being fixed, if i had chosen a different action then ϕ would have necessarily been false”.
This means that at w there is no action such that if 1 had chosen it then, after choosing it,
agent 1 would have necessarily known that the paper was going to be accepted. The problem
is that, before learning the choice of agent 2, 1 has a maximal uncertainty about it, i.e., 1 does
not know whether 2 is going to choose action S, action M or action L (see Figure 1b).
Note that passive agentive responsibility implies passive causal responsibility, because of
the truth axiom K◦•◦i ϕ→ ϕ for interim knowledge. That is:
|=E-GSTIT Resp
−(i,ϕ)→ CHP(i,ϕ) (8)
Another interesting observation concerns the condition K◦•◦i ϕ in the preceding definition
of passive agentive responsibility. This condition prevents from considering an agent as agen-
tively responsible for an outcome when the agent was not aware of the results of her choice.
For example, let us suppose that Bill asks Ann to choose a restaurant for dinner. Ann decides
to take him to her favourite restaurant. That night the main cook is ill and his assistant (who is
not as good of a cook) is in charge of the cuisine. As a result, the food is not as good as usual
and Bill is disappointed about the quality. Can we say that Ann is agentively responsible for
Bill’s bad experience? It does not seem to be the case, since Ann did not know that her choice
would lead to that result (as she did not know that the main cook was ill).
Finally, let us point out that the reason why we do not define passive agentive responsibility
as K◦•◦i CHP(i,ϕ) is that this definition would be too weak. Indeed, after making her choice,
an agent imay know that she could have prevented ϕ from being true without knowing exactly
which action could prevented ϕ from being true. This is related to the issue of uniform choice
discussed by [26].
We conclude this section by considering some interesting validities about agentive respon-
sibility. For τ ∈ {+,−} we have:
|=E-GSTIT (Resp
τ (i,ϕ) ∧ Respτ (i,ψ))→ Respτ (i,ϕ ∧ ψ) (9)
According to this validity, if an agent is actively/passively agentive responsible for ϕ and
she is actively/passively agentive responsible for ψ, then she is actively/passively agentive
responsible for ϕ and ψ. For instance in order to prove the validity |=E-GSTIT (Resp
−(i,ϕ) ∧
Resp−(i,ψ)) → Resp−(i,ϕ ∧ ψ) we proceed as follows: Resp−(i,ϕ) implies (1) K◦•◦i ϕ
while Resp−(i,ψ) implies (2) K◦•◦i ψ. (1) and (2) together imply (3) K
◦•◦
i (ϕ ∧ ψ). Moreover,
Resp−(i,ϕ) implies (4) 〈Agt \ {i} stit〉[Agt stit]K◦•◦i (¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ). (3) and (4) together are
equivalent to Resp−(i,ϕ ∧ ψ). Note that Resp−(i,ϕ ∧ ψ) → (Resp−(i,ϕ) ∧ Resp−(i,ψ)) is
not valid, because the fact that an agent could have prevented ϕ and ψ from being true together
does not necessarily imply that both ϕ and ψ could have been avoided. For example, Bill could
have prevented the state of affairs “Bill fails the exam and it is a sunny day” from being true,
since he would have passed the exam if he had studied harder. Clearly, this does not imply that
Bill could have prevented the state of affairs “it is a sunny day” from being true, as this state
of affairs is completely independent from Bill’s actual choice.
Moreover, Resp+(i,ϕ ∧ ψ) → (Resp+(i,ϕ) ∧ Resp+(i,ψ)) is not valid because of the
negative condition in the definition of the ‘deliberative’ STIT operator [i dstit]. The follow-
ing two validities highlight that an agent cannot be agentive responsible about tautologies or
contradictions which seems highly intuitive. For τ ∈ {+,−} we have:
|=E-GSTIT ¬Resp
τ (i,⊤) (10)
|=E-GSTIT ¬Resp
τ (i,⊥) (11)
4 Attribution emotions
In this section we use the concept of responsibility defined in Section 3 as departing point to
formalize the cognitive structure of attribution emotions, i.e., emotions such as guilt and pride
which are based on the attribution of responsibility for a given outcome either to the self or to
an external agent9. By ‘cognitive structure’ of an emotion, we mean the emotion’s triggering
conditions; that is, the agent’s mental states that prompt the agent’s emotional reaction and
‘cause’ the agent to feel the emotion.
We consider four different types of (cognitive structure of)10 attribution emotions resulting
from the combination of two different dimensions (see Table 2): internal vs. external attribu-
tion of responsibility [47]; and fulfillment vs. transgression of moral standards. Specifically,
attribution emotions are either based (1) on the attribution of responsibility for the transgres-
sion of one’s moral standards either to oneself (i.e., guilt or self-directed moral disapproval)
or to somebody else (i.e., reproach or other-directed moral disapproval); or (2) on the attribu-
tion of responsibility for the fulfillment of one’s moral standards either to oneself (i.e., pride
or self-directed moral approval) or to somebody else (i.e., admiration or other-directed moral
approval).
Table 2: The different kinds of attribution emotions
Responsibility attribution
Self Other
Self-directed Other-directed
Fulfilment moral approval moral approval
(Pride) (Admiration)
Self-directed Other-directed
Norm violation moral disapproval moral disapproval
(Guilt) (Reproach)M
o
ra
l
st
a
n
d
a
rd
Due to space restrictions we can not formalize the entire taxonomy of attribution emo-
tions. Therefore, we only consider attribution emotions based on the violation of moral stan-
dards, namely guilt and reproach. Following current psychological theories of guilt (see, e.g.,
[36, 21, 31]), we consider that the triggering condition of an agent i’s guilt feeling is the agent
i’s knowledge that she is responsible for having behaved in a morally reprehensible way. For-
mally:
Guilt(i)
def
= K◦◦•i Resp
+(i,viol i) ∨K
◦◦•
i Resp
−(i,viol i)
The special atomic formula viol i is used to identify worlds which are considered sub-ideal by
agent i; that is, those worlds that are in conflict with agent i’s moral standards. Moreover,
we consider that the triggering condition of an agent i’s feeling of reproach towards some
agent j is the agent i’s knowledge that agent j is responsible for having behaved in a morally
reprehensible way:
Reproach(i,j)
def
= K◦◦•i Resp
+(j,viol i) ∨K
◦◦•
i Resp
−(j,viol i)
9The term ‘attribution emotion’ is taken from Ortony et al. [37].
10Please note that for simplicity’s sake and in order to improve readability, we will employ the expression “(attribu-
tion) emotion” for speaking of “cognitive structure of (attribution) emotion”.
Note that in the preceding definitions we use the ex post knowledge operator K◦◦•i because,
in order to feel guilty, an agent i must reconsider the choice she has made retrospectively,
that is, after the choices of the rest of the agents have been revealed. The reason why the
interim knowledge operator K◦•◦i is not sufficient is that agent i can evaluate the effective
consequences of her choice, only after the choices of all agents have been revealed. By way
of example, consider a typical coordination problem in which Bob and Mary, two university
students, regularly meet in front of the university building at 12:30 a.m. in order to go to lunch
together. One day Bob decides to go to lunch without waiting for Mary, because he is uncertain
whether Mary will go to the usual meeting place. Indeed, Bob envisages the possibility that
Mary decided to stay home to prepare for an exam. Only after Bob discovers the actual choice
of Mary, namely that she came to the usual meeting place at 12:30 a.m., he does feel guilty for
having let Mary wait for him. The use of the ex post knowledge operator K◦◦•i in the definition
of reproach can be justified in an analogous way.
As highlighted in the former definitions, we assume that the responsibility type does not
play a role in the cognitive structures of guilt and reproach. In particular, we consider that
a guilt feeling may be triggered by attribution of either active (i.e., K◦◦•i Resp
+(i,viol i)) or
passive (i.e., K◦◦•i Resp
−(i,viol i)) responsibility to the self; whereas a reproach feeling can
be triggered by attribution of either active (i.e., K◦◦•i Resp
+(j,viol i)) or passive responsibil-
ity (i.e., K◦◦•i Resp
−(j,viol i)) to another agent. Nevertheless, the responsibility type can play
a role in the intensity of the emotion (a dimension that is however not studied further in this
article). For instance, as shown by psychologists [29], people experience more regret over neg-
ative outcomes that stem from actions taken (regret due to action) than from equally negative
outcomes resulting from actions foregone (regret due to inaction).
Before concluding, let us remark that an agent has positive introspection over her triggering
condition of guilt as well as over her triggering condition of reproach:
|=E-GSTIT Guilt(i)↔ K
◦◦•
i Guilt(i) (12)
|=E-GSTIT Reproach(i,j)↔ K
◦◦•
i Reproach(i,j) (13)
Moreover, according to our definition, the triggering condition of guilt feeling is nothing but
the triggering condition of self-reproach:
|=E-GSTIT Guilt(i)↔ Reproach(i,i) (14)
5 From individual to collective
In sections 3 and 4 we have studied the relevance of the concept of responsibility attribution
for emotion theory at the individual level. We now explore its collective dimension, and more
specifically, the implications of collective responsibility for collective guilt attribution.
In order to make the qualitative leap from the individual to the group dimension of re-
sponsibility, there are two main questions we must address at the theoretical level:11 first, the
possibility for a group of individuals to cause something by choosing to perform a given joint
action, i.e., what we could denominate ‘group choice condition’; and second, a related account
11These questions are widely raised in the literature. See notably [18, p. 122], who states: “[t]he root worry over
the idea of collective agentive responsibility may be a worry over the possibility over genuinely collective action and
intention.”
of group knowledge which allows us to distinguish a mere collective causal responsibility from
a collective agentive responsibility i.e., what we could denominate ‘group knowledge condi-
tion’. Indeed, in order to ascribe collective agentive responsibility to a given group of agents,
it does not suffice that the agents cause something by performing a given joint action. The
agents must also be collectively aware of the effects of their joint action.
The collective choice condition can be expressed in the logic E-GSTIT presented in Section
2. Indeed, in this logic one can express that (1) a group H ‘deliberatively’ sees to it that a state
of affairs ϕ is true or that (2) a group H could have prevented ϕ from being true. In order
to express sentences (1) and (2) we just need to generalize the ‘deliberative’ STIT operator
[i dstit] and the construction CHP(i,ϕ) defined in Section 3 to groups as follows. For any
H ∈ 2Agt∗:
[H dstit]ϕ
def
= [H stit]ϕ ∧ 〈∅ stit〉¬ϕ
CHP(H,ϕ)
def
= ϕ ∧ 〈Agt \H stit〉[Agt stit]¬ϕ
[H dstit]ϕ and CHP(H,ϕ) capture respectively group H’s active causal responsibility for
making ϕ true and group H’s passive causal responsibility for letting ϕ be true.
On the contrary, the preceding group knowledge condition cannot be expressed in the logic
E-GSTIT of Section 2. What the logic E-GSTIT misses is a modal operator of group knowl-
edge, which we present hereupon.
In the present work we assimilate the notion of group knowledge to the concept of common
knowledge which is widely used both in computer science [14] and in economics [4]. The
distinguishing feature of the notion of common knowledge is its reductionist view of group
knowledge, in the sense that common knowledge implies shared knowledge: when there is a
common knowledge in group J that ϕ is true, then each agent in J individually knows that ϕ is
true. Alternative “non-reductionist” notions of group knowledge have been studied both in the
philosophical literature on group attitudes [17, 41, 40] and in the logical literature [34].12 One
of these “non-reductionist” notions is collective acceptance [40], according to which a group
of individuals may collectively accept that ϕ is true even though some of its members do not
believe so individually. For example, the members of a Parliament might collectively accept
(qua members of the Parliament) that launching a military action against another country is
legitimate because the Parliament’s majority has decided so, even though some of them - who
voted against the military intervention - individually believe the contrary.
We introduce a new logic, E-GSTIT+, which extends E-GSTIT with three different types of
common knowledge modal operators, corresponding to the three different types of epistemic
operators presented in Section 2: ex ante common knowledge, interim common knowledge
and ex post common knowledge. Specifically, the language LE-GSTIT+(Atm,Agt) of the logic
E-GSTIT+ is the set of formulae defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [J stit]ϕ | K•◦◦i ϕ | K
◦•◦
i ϕ |
K◦◦•i ϕ | CK
•◦◦
H ϕ | CK
◦•◦
H ϕ | CK
◦◦•
H ϕ
where p ranges over Atm , J ranges over 2Agt , H ranges over 2Agt∗ and i ranges over Agt .
The truth conditions of E-GSTIT+ formulae are the ones given in Definition 5, plus the
following three additional conditions for ex-ante, interim and ex-post common knowledge.
12Although extremely important, this debate between reductionist vs. non-reductionist views of group knowledge
escapes the scope of this article. See [33] for a synthetic overview of this debate.
Definition 6 (Truth conditions (cont.)) Let M be an ESCN and w a world in M :
M,w |= CK•◦◦H ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ W such that w(E
•◦◦
H )
+
v : M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= CK◦•◦H ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ W such that w(E
◦•◦
H )
+
v : M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= CK◦◦•H ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ W such that w(E
◦◦•
H )
+
v : M, v |= ϕ
where for x ∈ {• ◦ ◦, ◦ • ◦, ◦ ◦ •}, ExH =
⋃
i∈H E
x
i and (E
x
H)
+ is the transitive closure of ExH .
For any formula ϕ of the language LE-GSTIT+(Atm,Agt), we write |=E-GSTIT+ ϕ if ϕ is
E-GSTIT+ valid, that is, if ϕ is true in all ESCNs (i.e., for all ESCNs M and for all worlds w
in M , we have M,w |= ϕ). We say that ϕ is E-GSTIT+ satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not E-GSTIT+
valid.
In logic E-GSTIT+ we can finally draw the distinction between the notion of collective
causal responsibility defined above and the notion of collective agentive responsibility. This
distinction parallels the one made in Section 3 between individual causal responsibility and
individual agentive responsibility.
For the active form of collective agentive responsibility we define:
Resp+(H,ϕ)
def
= CK◦•◦H [H dstit]ϕ
This means that the agents in group H are together agentively responsible (in the active sense)
for bringing about ϕ (denoted by Resp+(H,ϕ)) if and only if, there is common knowledge in
group H that the group makes ϕ true and that ϕ is not something inevitable. In other words,
group H knowingly sees to it that ϕ.
We employ the interim common knowledge operator CK◦•◦H instead of the ex ante com-
mon knowledge operator CK•◦◦H or the ex post common knowledge operator CK
◦◦•
H because,
similarly to the case of individual agentive responsibility, in order to be agentively responsible
for something, the agents in a group have to be mutually aware of the potential effects of their
joint action after having made their choice but before knowing the choices of the agents outside
the group.
For the passive form of collective agentive responsibility we define:
Resp−(H,ϕ)
def
= CK◦•◦H ϕ ∧ 〈Agt \H stit〉[Agt stit]CK
◦•◦
H ¬ϕ
This means that the agents in groupH are together responsible (in the passive sense) for letting
ϕ be true if and only if: (1) they have common knowledge that their current joint action leads
to ϕ (i.e., CK◦•◦H ϕ) and (2) given what the agents outside H have decided to do, if the agents
in H had chosen a different joint action, then they would have necessarily acquired common
knowledge of the contrary (i.e., 〈Agt\H stit〉[Agt stit]CK◦•◦H ¬ϕ). Note that the passive form
of collective agentive responsibility implies the passive form of collective causal responsibility,
because of the truth axiom CK◦•◦H ϕ→ ϕ for interim common knowledge. That is:
|=E-GSTIT+ Resp
−(H,ϕ)→ CHP(H,ϕ) (15)
Another interesting observation concerns the relationship between collective agentive re-
sponsibility and individual agentive responsibility. According to our definitions, the former
does not necessarily imply the latter, in the sense that a group of agents may be collec-
tively responsible for ϕ, either in the active or the passive sense, even though some of its
members are not. Indeed, the following E-GSTIT+ formulae are satisfiable with i ∈ H:
Resp+(H,ϕ) ∧ ¬Resp+(i,ϕ) and Resp−(H,ϕ) ∧ ¬Resp−(i,ϕ). The reason why these for-
mulae are satisfiable lays in the group choice condition. In particular, in the logic E-GSTIT
the fact that a group H causes ϕ to be true (i.e., [H dstit]ϕ) does not necessarily imply that
each agent in H causes ϕ to be true (i.e., [i dstit]ϕ with i ∈ H) , and the fact that a group
H could have prevented ϕ from being true (i.e., CHP(H,ϕ)) does not necessarily imply that
each agent in H could have prevented ϕ from being true (i.e., CHP(i,ϕ) with i ∈ H).
Once we have made the leap from the individual to the collective dimension of responsibil-
ity attribution, we can make the link with the concept of collective guilt. Following Gilbert’s
philosophical account of collective guilt [18], we say that the agents in a groupH feel together
guilty (denoted by Guilt(H)) if and only if the agents inH have common knowledge that they
are together responsible for having behaved in a morally reprehensible way:
Guilt(H)
def
= CK◦◦•H Resp
+(H,violH) ∨ CK
◦◦•
H Resp
−(H,violH)
where violH
def
=
∧
i∈H viol i. The construction violH is used to identify worlds which are
considered subideal by all agents in the group H; that is, those worlds that are in conflict with
the moral standards of all agents in H .
As the following E-GSTIT+ validity highlights, a group has positive introspection over its
collective guilt, in the sense that the agents in a group feel together guilty, if and only if they
have common knowledge of the following:
|=E-GSTIT+ Guilt(H)↔ CK
◦◦•
H Guilt(H) (16)
Gilbert makes the distinction between the preceding type of collective guilt and what she
calls membership guilt, where an agent feels guilty because of her belonging to a group which
is responsible for having behaved in a morally reprehensible way. This notion of membership
guilt is expressed by the E-GSTIT+ formula:
K◦◦•i Resp
+(H,viol i) ∨K
◦◦•
i Resp
−(H,viol i) for i ∈ H
In the following section we deal with more technical issues by studying the computational
complexity of the logic E-GSTIT+.
6 Complexity issues
There are a number of questions that are worth mentioning regarding decidability of the logics
presented in Sections 2 and 5. Firstly, we must note that the satisfiability problem of the
logic GSTIT interpreted over Kripke group STIT models (see Definition 2) is undecidable if
there are more than 2 agents. This result has been proved by [25], where it is shown that
the logic GSTIT with n agents interpreted over Kripke group STIT models is just the product
logic S5n whose satisfiability problem has been proved to be undecidable when n ≥ 3 [15].
Secondly, from Theorem 1 given in Section 2.2, one can prove the following corollary about
the connection between the notion of GSTIT satisfiability with respect to the class of STIT
models with choice names (SCNs) and the notion of GSTIT satisfiability with respect to the
class of Kripke group STIT models.
Corollary 1 Let ϕ be a formula of the language LGSTIT(Atm,Agt) and let card(Act) = n
with n ∈ N ∪ {∞}. Then, there exists a SCN M and a world w in M such that M,w |= ϕ
if and only if there exists a Kripke group STIT model M ′ whose number of choices is bounded
by n and a world w′ in M ′ such that M ′, w′ |= ϕ.
It follows that, if card(Act) = ∞, then the notion of GSTIT satisfiability with respect to the
class of SCNs and the notion of GSTIT satisfiability with respect to the class of Kripke group
STIT models are equivalent. Consequently, if card(Act) = ∞ and card(Agt) ≥ 3, then
the problem of testing satisfiability of a GSTIT formula with respect to the class of SCNs is
undecidable too.
Therefore, since the logic E-GSTIT is nothing but an extension of the logic GSTIT, from
Corollary 1 it follows that, if the set of action terms Act is infinite and there are more than 2
agents in Agt , then the satisfiability problems of the logics E-GSTIT and E-GSTIT+ are also
undecidable. This is the reason why we are interested in studying the decidability of E-GSTIT
and E-GSTIT+ under the assumption that the set of action terms Act is finite.
In what follows we focus on the complexity of the satisfiability problem of E-GSTIT+
under the assumption that Act is finite.
We are going to prove that, if Act is finite, the logic E-GSTIT+ can be embedded into the
decidable logic S5-PDL; i.e., the variant of propositional dynamic logic PDL [22] in which
atomic programs are interpreted by means of equivalence relations.
Let Atm+ = Atm ∪ {chi:a|i ∈ Agt and a ∈ Act}. The special atomic propositions chi:a
are used to describe the action chosen by an agent at a given world. In particular, chi:a has
to be read “the agent i chooses the action a”. For all H ∈ 2Agt∗ and for all αH ∈ ActH we
define:
chαH
def
=
∧
i∈H chi:αH(i)
where chαH has to be read “the agents in the coalition H choose the joint action αH”.
The language LS5−PDL(Atm
+,Agt) of S5-PDL is defined as follows:
pi ::= ≡|∼i| pi1;pi2 | pi1 ∪ pi2 | pi
∗ |?ϕ
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [pi]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm+ and i ranges over Agt . The atomic program ≡ is used to simulate
the STIT operator [∅ stit] for the empty coalition, whereas the atomic program ∼i is used
to simulate the ex ante knowledge operator K•◦◦i for agent i. The dual of the operator [pi] is
defined in the standard way as follows: 〈pi〉ϕ
def
= ¬[pi]¬ϕ.
S5-PDL models are tuples M = 〈W,R≡, {R∼i}i∈Agt , I〉 where:
• W is a set of worlds,
• R≡ and all R∼i are equivalence relations on W ,
• I : Atm+ −→ 2W is a valuation function.
Binary relations for complex programs are defined in the standard way as follows:
Rpi1;pi2 = Rpi1 ;Rpi2
Rpi1∪pi2 = Rpi1 ∪Rpi2
Rpi∗ = (Rpi)
∗
R?ϕ = {(w,w)|w ∈W and M,w |= ϕ}
Truth conditions of S5-PDL formulae are the standard ones for Boolean operators plus the
following one for the operator [pi]:
M,w |= [pi]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ Rpi(w) :M, v |= ϕ
For any formula ϕ of the language LS5−PDL(Atm
+,Agt), we write |=S5−PDL ϕ if ϕ is S5-PDL
valid, that is, if ϕ is true in all S5-PDL models (i.e., for all S5-PDL models M and for all
worlds w inM , we haveM,w |= ϕ). We say that ϕ is S5-PDL satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not S5-PDL
valid. Moreover, we shall say that ϕ is a global logical consequence in S5-PDL of a finite set of
global axioms Γ = {χ1, . . . , χn}, denoted by Γ |=S5−PDL ϕ, if and only if for every S5-PDL
model M , if Γ is true in M (i.e., for every world w in M , we have M,w |= χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn)
then ϕ is true in M too (i.e., for every world w in M , we have M,w |= ϕ).
Proposition 1 The satisfiability problem of S5-PDL is in ExpTime.
PROOF. The logic S5-PDL is polynomially embeddable into PDL extended with converse, by
simulating S5 programs≡ and∼i with composite programs (x∪−x)
∗ and (xi∪−xi)
∗ where
x and xi are arbitrary atomic programs interpreted by means of binary relations Rx and Rxi ,
−x is the converse of x and −xi is the converse of xi . (Note indeed that relations R(x∪−x)∗
and R(xi∪−xi)∗ are equivalence relations.) The satisfiability problem of PDL with converse
has been proved to be ExpTime-complete [44]. It follows that the satisfiability problem of
S5-PDL is in ExpTime. 
We define the following translation from the E-GSTIT+ language LE-GSTIT+(Atm,Agt) to
LS5−PDL(Atm
+,Agt) for p ∈ Atm and H ∈ 2Agt∗:
tr(p) = p
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ)
tr([∅ stit]ϕ) = [≡]tr(ϕ)
tr([H stit]ϕ) =
[ ⋃
αH∈ActH
(?chαH ; ≡ ;?chαH )
]
tr(ϕ)
tr(K•◦◦i ϕ) = [∼i]tr(ϕ)
tr(K◦•◦i ϕ) =
[ ⋃
a∈Act
(?chi:a; ∼i ;?chi:a)
]
tr(ϕ)
tr(K◦◦•i ϕ) =
[ ⋃
αAgt∈ActAgt
(?chαAgt ; ∼i ;?chαAgt )
]
tr(ϕ)
tr(CK•◦◦H ϕ) =
[
(
⋃
i∈H
∼i)
∗
]
tr(ϕ)
tr(CK◦•◦H ϕ) =
[
(
⋃
i∈H,a∈Act
(?chi:a; ∼i ;?chi:a))
∗
]
tr(ϕ)
tr(CK◦◦•H ϕ) =
[
(
⋃
i∈H,αAgt∈ActAgt
(?chαAgt ; ∼i ;?chαAgt ))
∗
]
tr(ϕ)
As the following lemma highlights, the validity problem in E-GSTIT+ can be reduced to
the problem of (global) logical consequence in S5-PDL.
Lemma 1 A E-GSTIT+ formula ϕ is E-GSTIT+ valid, i.e., |=E-GSTIT+ ϕ, if and only if tr(ϕ) is
a logical consequence of the set of global axioms ΓAgt,Act in S5-PDL, i.e., ΓAgt,Act |=S5−PDL
tr(ϕ), where:
ΓAgt,Act =
{ ∨
a∈Act
chi:a|i ∈ Agt
}
∪
{
chi:a → ¬chi:b|i ∈ Agt , a, b ∈ Act and a 6= b
}
∪{
(〈≡〉ch1:αAgt (1) ∧ . . . ∧ 〈≡〉chn:αAgt (n))→ 〈≡〉chαAgt |αAgt ∈ ActAgt
}
PROOF.(Sketch) (⇒) Take an arbitrary ESCN M = 〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt ,
{E•◦◦i , E
◦•◦
i , E
◦◦•
i }i∈Agt ,V〉 which satisfies formula ϕ. We build a corresponding S5-PDL
model M ′ = 〈W,R≡, {R∼i}i∈Agt , I〉 such that:
• R≡ = R∅;
• for all i ∈ AGT , R∼i = E
•◦◦
i ;
• for all p ∈ Atm , I(p) = V(p);
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all a ∈ Act , I(chi:a) = {w ∈W |Ai(w) = a}.
By induction on the structure of ϕ, it is easy to check that tr(ϕ) is satisfied by M ′ and that for
every χ ∈ Γ, M ′, w |= χ for all w ∈W .
(⇐) Take an arbitrary S5-PDL modelM = 〈W,R≡, {R∼i}i∈Agt , I〉which satisfies tr(ϕ)
such that that for all χ ∈ Γ and for all w ∈ W , M,w |= χ. We build a corresponding ESCN
M ′ = 〈W, {Ai}i∈Agt , {RJ}J⊆Agt , {E
•◦◦
i , E
◦•◦
i , E
◦◦•
i }i∈Agt ,V〉 such that:
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all a ∈ Act , Ai(w) = a if and only if w ∈ I(chi:a);
• R∅ = R≡;
• for all H ∈ 2Agt∗, RH = {(w, v)|wR∅v and AH(w) = AH(v)};
• for all i ∈ Agt , E•◦◦i = R∼i ;
• for all i ∈ Agt , E◦•◦i = {(w, v)|wE
•◦◦
i v and Ai(w) = Ai(v)};
• for all i ∈ AGT , E◦◦•i = {(w, v)|wE
•◦◦
i v and AAgt(w) = AAgt(v)};
• for all p ∈ Atm , V(p) = I(p).
Again, by induction on the structure of ϕ, it is easy to check that ϕ is satisfied by M ′. 
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 we obtain the following complexity result for E-GSTIT+
under the assumption that the set of action terms Act is finite.
Theorem 2 Let Act be a finite set. Then, the satisfiability problem of E-GSTIT+ is decidable
in exponential time.
PROOF. The logic E-GSTIT+ is an extension of the logic of common knowledge which has
been proved to be ExpTime-complete [14]. This provides an argument for the ExpTime-
hardness of the satisfiability problem of E-GSTIT+.
It is a routine task to verify that the problem of global logical consequence in S5-PDL
with a finite number of global axioms is reducible to the problem of validity in S5-PDL. In
particular, if Γ = {χ1, . . . , χm} we have Γ |=S5−PDL ϕ if and only if |=S5−PDL [any
∗](χ1 ∧
. . . χm) → ϕ where any is the special program defined as any
def
= (
⋃
i∈Agt ∼i ∪ ≡).
Hence, by Lemma 1 and by the fact that ΓAgt,Act is finite (because Act and Agt are fi-
nite), it follows that a E-GSTIT+ formula ϕ is E-GSTIT+ valid if and only if |=S5−PDL
[any∗](
∧
χ∈ΓAgt,Act
χ)→ tr(ϕ). Consequently, given the fact that tr is a polynomial reduction
of E-GSTIT+ to S5-PDL and given also the fact that the satisfiability problem of S5-PDL is
in ExpTime (Proposition 1), it follows that the satisfiability problem of E-GSTIT+ is also in
ExpTime. 
Given that E-GSTIT+ is an extension of E-GSTIT, Theorem 2 also provides a decidabil-
ity result for the logic E-GSTIT. We conjecture that the satisfiability problem of the logic
E-GSTIT with Act finite is PSPACE-complete. Unfortunately, we shall postpone an in-depth
analysis of this interesting issue to future work.
7 Related Work
There have been other attempts to combine the logic STIT with epistemic modalities (see, e.g.,
[10, 8, 26]) in the past. However, to our knowledge, the present work is the first attempt to
combine group STIT with (1) three types of epistemic operators for ex ante, interim and ex
post knowledge and (2) their corresponding operators of ex ante, interim and ex post com-
mon knowledge, providing (3) an analysis of the computational complexity of this extension
of STIT. As emphasized in Section 2, the distinction between ex ante, interim and ex post
knowledge is commonly used in the theory of normal form games [3]. Since basic group
STIT without knowledge and common knowledge is already undecidable, in the present work
we have focused on an epistemic extension of group STIT under the assumption that agents’
available choices are finite. It is worth noting that a similar idea of formalizing ex ante, interim
and ex post knowledge in STIT is sketched by [7]. However, his analysis is more restrictive
than ours since he assumes perfect information, whereas our logic E-GSTIT allows for uncer-
tainty over the states of the world. Furthermore, [7] does not consider common knowledge or
complexity issues for this STIT extension.
The additional original contribution of the present work is the alternative semantics for
group STIT in terms of STIT models with choice names (SCNs). As underlined in Section 2,
SCNs provide an explicit action-based version of the semantics for group STIT. An interesting
aspect of SCNs is that it provides a representation of social interaction that is very close to the
game-theoretic representation of social interaction (in which actions and strategies of agents
and coalitions are explicit).
On the conceptual side, the formalization we propose in this article represents the first
logical analysis, based on STIT logic, of attribution emotions (and more concretely guilt) that
deals with the responsibility aspect of such phenomena.
Our formalization of active and passive responsibility also constitutes a novelty, as earlier
works mainly focus on the active aspect of responsibility. For instance, we can find a similar
notion of moral responsibility in [32, p. 110] where, in order “[...] to be blamed for ϕ, the agent
must have the intention to attain ϕ, or at least, intentionally let it happen.” However, the latter
do not include in their definition the passive aspect of responsibility. Furthermore, Lima et al.’s
[32, p. 101] formalization of responsibility also introduces the notion of agent’s knowledge,
defining for each agent an equivalence relation between possible worlds. Still, they do not
specify the temporal nature of such knowledge with respect to the agent’s choice of action, that
is, the notion of knowledge introduced allows them to express agent’s incomplete knowledge
about the situation, but in a general way. Our E-GSTIT introduces three different concepts and
corresponding modal operators of knowledge: K•◦◦i , K
◦•◦
i and K
◦◦•
i ϕ, which add substantial
profundity to the analysis and allows to capture subtleties that a general knowledge operator
may not.
Other works, such as [13], present a formalization of responsibility and other organization-
related concepts, where organizations are viewed as ‘instances of normative systems’ formed
of agents’ interaction patterns obeying the rules stated by a normative system. Organizations,
and therefore responsibilities, are analyzed from the point of view of the rules to which the
organized group of agents is subjected. The latter authors do include the passive aspect of re-
sponsibility, in the sense that “the agent could have prevented ϕ from happening”, and chained
responsibility for others’ actions (‘responsibility for other’s agency’ and ‘responsibility with
possibility of delegation’). However, they do not include the collective aspect of responsibility.
In addition, Cholvy et al. [13] do not make the distinction between the three types of knowl-
edge (ex ante, interim and ex post) that is crucial for the analysis of responsibility attribution.
In this line of research, we can also refer to [20]. While Grossi et al. are able to handle in
quite fine-grained details the notion of plan having at disposals sets of atomic actions, they do
not capture the collective aspect of responsibility, but rather indirect responsibility in the sense
of delegation, or influence, likewise to [13]. Agents’ activities are captured via “bringing-it-
about” modal constructs and organizational activities (in particular delegation) are described
via modal operators modeling forms of indirect action or influence (“bringing-it-about indi-
rectly that”).
Furthermore, most of the existing formalizations do not contemplate the role of responsi-
bility attribution in the theory of attribution emotions. For instance, the formal representation
presented in [1] does not include guilt, and [39] does not present a model of attribution emo-
tions based on a systematic logical analysis of causal and moral responsibility.
Therefore, although there have certainly been other attempts to investigate the concept of
responsibility in multi-agent systems with the help of logical methods, up to now there is no
comprehensive logical study of the following two aspects of responsibility attribution: 1) the
individual and the collective dimensions of responsibility attribution (i.e., an agent ascribing
responsibility for an action to herself or to another agent vs. a group of agents ascribing respon-
sibility for an action to itself or to another group of agents); 2) the active and passive aspects of
responsibility; and 3) the role of responsibility attribution in the theory of attribution emotions.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the logical literature on responsibility.
8 Conclusion
We have provided a formal analysis of the concept of responsibility attribution with the help of
an extension of the logic STIT with modal operators for individual and common knowledge.
Furthermore, we have studied decidability of the satisfiability problems of our logics E-GSTIT
and E-GSTIT+ under the assumption that agents’ choices are finite. More specifically, we have
proved that the complexity of the satisfiability problem of E-GSTIT+ is ExpTime-complete.
The general insight gained from our paper is that a fine-grained and comprehensive analysis
of the concept of agentive responsibility (both along the dimensions active vs. passive and
individual vs. collective) and of the related concept of attribution emotion requires a distinction
between the three types of ex ante, interim and ex post knowledge. For example, as shown in
Section 3, the operator of interim knowledge is required to formally characterize the concept of
active agentive responsibility. Indeed, in order to define active agentive responsibility, we need
to represent the agent’s epistemic state after she has made her choice. The main innovation of
our extension of STIT lies therefore in the possibility of distinguishing these three forms of
knowledge.
Directions of future research are manifold. On the technical side, we plan to study the
complexity of the satisfiability problem of the less expressive logic E-GSTIT. Another issue
for future research is the problem of finding sound and complete axiomatizations for both
E-GSTIT and E-GSTIT+.
On the conceptual side, we are aware that this paper represents only the first step towards a
more general logical account of the individual and collective aspects of responsibility attribu-
tion. Henceforth, we plan to enrich our analysis of collective emotions by considering emotion
types different from collective guilt, such as collective pride and collective reproach. We also
plan to investigate the logical relationship between guilt and shame. This topic has been al-
ready studied in the past by [42] in a framework based on dynamic logic. We consider that
our approach based on STIT logic can provide interesting insights on the role responsibility
attribution plays in the cognitive structure of shame.
Finally, we defer to future research an extension of the basic framework E-GSTIT with a
weaker or less demanding notion of group knowledge than that of common knowledge used in
the present article, such as for example distributed knowledge or the non-reductionist notion
of collective acceptance studied by [34].
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